Día 1 – Miércoles 19 de abril
Workshop: Cognitive Phenomenology and Metacognitive Feelings
Lugar: Auditorio 1, piso 2, Edificio de Extensión, Universidad de Antioquia
9:00-9:15 – Welcome and introduction to the workshop
9:15-10:15 – Galen Strawson (Texas): ‘Experience consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements’ (Kant)
– This talk consider a number of issues in the cognitive phenomenology debate, e.g. [1] what is the source of resistance to acknowledging the existence of cognitive phenomenology? [2] the effectiveness of ‘contrast cases’ (Jack and Jacques) [3] why isn’t the ‘argument from boredom’ thought to be decisive? [4] Can we allow both [i] that there is a sense in which two people who understand the sentence justice is a virtuehave the same cognitive-phenomenological experience and [ii] that there is a sense in which two people who understand the sentence justice is a virtue may have different cognitive-phenomenological experience? Link a texto recomendado
10:35-11:35 – Michelle Montague (Texas): Cognitive phenomenology and content
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CHARLA CANCELADA: Reinaldo Bernal: The character of cognitive phenomenology
– Some authors consider that there is a cognitive phenomenology. However, there disagree concerning whether every case has a sensory character or there are cases with a character proprietary of cognition. First, I will point out that it is unclear in this debate what the criterion is to establish whether a cognitive phenomenology has a sensory character, and I will propose a plausible criterion. Next, I will argue that the so-called epistemic feelings, on the one hand, are the best candidates to classify as cases of proprietary cognitive phenomenology, but on the other hand, comply with the criterion to consider their phenomenology to be sensory.
11-35-12:35 Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes y Elizabeth Cardona Muñoz: Cognitive Phenomenology and Phenomenal Concepts
– Cognitive phenomenology is nothing but our cognitive experience. This means that it is not just our sensations and perceptions which possess a phenomenological character; our conscious thoughts possess it too (Strawson, 1994, 2009, 2011; Pitt, 2004; Chudnoff, 2015; Montague 2015). A case of cognitive experience is understanding experience and this experience has a content: more specifically, a cognitive experiential qualitative content. According to Strawson (1994), there is no natural language in which we can specify this content or this cognitive experience. Our purpose in this talk is, precisely, to attempt to specify it. We think that the best way in which we can specify cognitive experience is via “phenomenal concepts”. These concepts constitute a strategy of sensory phenomenology, but our thesis is that cognitive phenomenal concepts may exist; in particular, we claim that “understanding” can be a cognitive phenomenal concept.
2:30-3:30 – Santiago Arango (UdeA) – Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings
– The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that metacognitive feelings can be considered as instances of non-sensory cognitive phenomenology. This talk reviews the controversy about the cognitive phenomenology, and assesses Goldman’s proposal in order to determine whether metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The talk will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that metacognitive feelings are instances of cognitive phenomenology.
3:50-4:50 – Elijah Chudnoff (Miami): Cognitive phenomenology in problem solving
– The literature on problem solving contains a number of studies and ideas bearing on cognitive phenomenology. These include novel phenomenal contrasts, forms of metacognition, and indications of structural similarities between sensory and intellectual experience. The aim of this talk is to explore this terrain and indicate some ways the recent debates about cognitive phenomenology in the philosophical literature might be enriched by attention to it.
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